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A model is deﬁned that predicts an agent’s ascriptions of causality (and related notions of facilitation and justiﬁcation)
between two events in a chain, based on background knowledge about the normal course of the world. Background knowl-
edge is represented by non-monotonic consequence relations. This enables the model to handle situations of poor infor-
mation, where background knowledge is not accurate enough to be represented in, e.g., structural equations. Tentative
properties of causality ascriptions are discussed, and the conditions under which they hold are identiﬁed (preference for
abnormal factors, transitivity, coherence with logical entailment, and stability with respect to disjunction and conjunction).
Empirical data are reported to support the psychological plausibility of our basic deﬁnitions.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The problem of causal ascription that we will consider in this article needs to be carefully distinguished
from two other causality problems more commonly studied in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI), namely, diagnosis
and the simulation of dynamical systems. Note, however, that making a distinction between diﬀerent problems
where causality is involved does not presuppose any opinion about whether causality is a unique notion – it
only suggests that diﬀerent problems can emphasize diﬀerent aspects of a possibly unique notion .
Diagnosis problems are basically a matter of abduction: One takes advantage of the knowledge of some
causal links to infer the most plausible causes of an observed event [1].1 In this setting, causality relations
are often modelled by conditional probabilities Pr(eﬀectjcause). Nevertheless, Bayesian networks [3] that rep-
resent a joint probability distribution by means of a directed graph do not necessarily reﬂect causal links
between their nodes, because diﬀerent graphical representations can be obtained depending on the ordering0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2007.07.003
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1 However, model-based diagnosis is rather a matter of inconsistency checking, ﬁnding contradictions between good behavior
assumptions and current observations of a system [2], and does not refer to ideas of causality.
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which we will come back at the end of this article.
Dynamical systems are modelled in AI in terms of qualitative physics [6], or by means of logics of action [7–
9]. Material implication being inappropriate to represent a causal link, the latter approaches deﬁne a ‘causal
rule’ as ‘if action A has been executed then there exists a cause for B,’ where ‘there exists a cause for B’ is
expressed by means of a modal operator. Such causal theories are generally non-monotonic, leaving room
for abnormality. Indeed, the behavior of these causal theories tends to minimize unexplained (uncaused)
abnormality [10]. Our approach will give a central role to the notion of abnormality in the detection of causal
relations, in contrast with the aforementioned causal theories [7–10], in which abnormality is merely mini-
mized, and only denotes the lack of an explanation. Furthermore, these approaches only establish the exis-
tence of causes, but do not identify causes as such.
The problem of causal ascription discussed in this paper is not one of abductive diagnosis (neither does it
deal with the qualitative simulation of dynamical systems, nor with the problem of describing changes caused
by the execution of actions, nor with what does not change when actions are performed). Our problem is to
infer an unknown causal relation from two known events and some background non-causal knowledge.2 We
are concerned here with the ascription of causal relations within a sequence of reported events, that is, the
detection of pairs of events that can be considered as related by a causality relation, under the normal course
of things. In some sense, our work is reminiscent of the ‘causal logic’ of Shafer [11], which provides a logical
setting that aims at describing the possible relations of concomitance between events when an action takes
place. However, Shafer’s logic does not leave room for abnormality. This notion is central in our approach,
as our view of normal causality directly relates to relations of qualitative independence explored in possibility
theory [12] – causality and independence being somewhat antagonistic notions.
Models of causal ascriptions presuppose a representation of the underlying causality-ascribing agent’s knowl-
edge. Unlike standard diagnosis problems, causality ascription is a problem of describing as ‘causal’ the link
between two observed events in a sequence. The ﬁrst step in modelling causal ascription is to deﬁne causality
in the language chosen for the underlying representation of knowledge. In this article, we deﬁne and discuss a
model of causal ascription that represents knowledge bymeans of non-monotonic consequence relations obeying
the rules of System P.3 Indeed, agents often possess poor knowledge about the world, under the form of default
rules. Clearly, this type of background knowledge is less accurate than, e.g., structural equations. It is neverthe-
less appropriate to predict causal ascriptions in situations of restricted knowledge. We ﬁrst present the logical
language wewill use to represent background knowledge.We then deﬁne ourmain notion of causality and estab-
lish some formal properties of themodel. Next, we introduce a new notion (facilitation), which is less committing
than causality, in terms of the beliefs required from the agent. Empirical data on facilitation vs. causality ascrip-
tions are reported to support the distinction between these two notions. Finally, we relate our model to other
works on causality in AI, and distinguish the notion of epistemic justiﬁcation from that of causality.
2. Ascribing causality
An agent capable of acknowledging a causality link between two reported events must possess some back-
ground knowledge allowing the recognition of normal patterns of occurrence in a set of reported facts. Indeed,
some recent work in AI has emphasized the role of norms (in both the deontic and non-deontic meanings of
the term) for ascribing causal links in car accident reports [17,18]. Hence, a prerequisite for a proper deﬁnition
of causality ascription is a language for describing the agent’s generic knowledge. This knowledge is generally
qualitative in nature, but should tolerate exceptional situations, since an agent is often capable of distinguish-
ing normal courses of things from abnormal ones.
In the following deﬁnitions, A, B, C, and F are events modelling either actions or descriptions of states of
aﬀairs. Notations do not discriminate between actions and descriptions, since this distinction does not yet play
a role in the model. Events are time-stamped (e.g., At) when they are reported facts.2 In contrast, abductive diagnosis amounts to inferring an unknown event (the cause) from a known event (the eﬀect) and a known
causal relation.
3 This model was ﬁrst advocated in two workshop papers [13,14]. The present paper is an expanded version of [15,16].
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An agent is supposed to have observed or learned of a sequence of events, e.g. :Bt, At, Btþk. This expresses
that B was false at time t, when A took place, and that B became true afterwards (t + k denotes a time point
after t). There is no uncertainty about these events.
Moreover, the agent maintains a knowledge base made of conditional statements of the form ‘in context C,
if A takes place then B is generally true afterwards’, or ‘in context C, B is generally true’. These will be denoted
by At ^ Ct Btþk, and by Ct Bt, respectively. (Time indices will be omitted when there is no risk of confusion.)
The conditional beliefs of an agent with respect to B when A takes place or not in context C can take three
forms: (i) If A takes place B is generally true afterwards: At ^ Ct Bt + k; (ii) If A takes place B is generally
false afterwards: At ^ Ct :Btþk; (iii) If A takes place, one cannot say whether B is generally true or false after-
wards. In this case, neither At ^ Ct Bt + k nor At ^ Ct :Btþk holds. The fact that an agent cannot assert
A B is denoted by A B.
We assume that the non-monotonic consequence relation satisﬁes the requirements of ‘System P’ [19];
namely, is reﬂexive and the following postulates and characteristic properties hold (  denotes classical
logical entailment):
• Right Weakening: E F and F  G imply E G
• Left AND: E F and E G imply E F ^ G
• Right OR: E G and F G imply E _ F G
• Cautious monotony: E F and E G imply E ^ F G
• Cut: E F and E ^ F G imply E G
As we are describing propositions as events (or subsets of possible worlds), and not as well-formed formulas
of propositional logic, we do not need any syntax independence axiom. Right Weakening and Left AND together
imply that the set of beliefs of the agent is deductively closed. Right OR avoids the need for reasoning by cases. Cut
follows from the other axioms. CautiousMonotony andCut replaceMonotony and Transitivity properties of clas-
sical inference so as to lay bare the possibility of exceptional situations, and make this setting maximally cautious.
System P enjoys only one half of the deduction theorem:
• HD: E ^ F G implies E :F _ G.
In addition, we shall sometimes assume the property of Rational Monotony [20], a strong version of Cau-
tious Monotony involving an explicit handling of operator as a means of reasoning about ignorance:
• Rational Monotony: E :F and E G imply E ^ F G
Empirical studies repeatedly demonstrated [21–25] that System P and Rational Monotony provide a psy-
chologically plausible representation of background knowledge and default inference. Arguments for using
non-monotonic logics in modeling causal reasoning were also discussed in the cognitive science literature
[26]. Finally, system P is known to be a qualitative variant of probabilistic reasoning, since the axioms of sys-
tem P hold for inﬁnitesimal conditional probabilities [27,3]. These axioms hold as well for a special kind of
standard probabilities, namely, big-stepped probabilities [28,29]. There also exists a possibilistic semantic
for System P, which holds for any kind of possibility measure [30]. Moreover, adding Rational Monotony
comes down to reasoning with a single possibility distribution in possibilistic logic [30].
2.2. A deﬁnition of causality ascription
Assume that in a given context, described by the situation where the agent knows thatC holds, the occurrence
of eventB is considered to be exceptional (i.e.,C :B). Assume now that for some eventA, it is part of the agent’s
background knowledge that A ^ C B. If both conditions are satisﬁed, we will say that in context C, A is per-
ceived to be the cause of B when an agent learns that B was false when A was reported, then B became true.
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Ct (the context) the conjunction of all other facts known by, or reported to, the agent at time t. If the agent
possesses the pieces of default knowledge that C :B and A ^ C B, the agent will perceive At to be the cause
of Bt + k in context Ct, denoted Ct : At)caBtþk.
In the above deﬁnition A can stand for any compound reported fact such as A 0 ^ A00. Note that our formal
framework for causality ascription is based on the use of system P: that is, it only uses pieces of background
knowledge featuring . However, let us stress that the causality relation C : A)caB is distinct from the non-
monotonic consequence relation . This feature departs from works viewing causal relations as particular
non-monotonic consequence relations (e.g., [31]).
Example 2 (Driving while intoxicated). When driving, one has generally no accident, Drive :Accident. This
is no longer true when driving fast while drunk, which normally leads to an accident, Drive ^ Fast ^
Drunk Accident. Suppose now that an accident took place after the driver drove fast while being drunk.
Fast ^ Drunk will be perceived as the cause of the accident.
In our model, C :B and A ^ C B must be understood as pieces of default knowledge used by the agent
to interpret the chain of reported facts :Bt (in context C), At, Btþk. An interesting situation arises when, in
context C, an agent learns of the sequence :Bt, At, and Btþk, while it believes that :Bt ^ C :Btþk, and that
At ^ C :Btþk. Then the agent cannot consider that C : At )caBt + k, and it may suspect some fact went unre-
ported: ﬁnding about it would amount to a diagnosis problem. In contrast, when an agent believes that C :B
and A ^ C B, and learns of the sequence of events :Bt, At, and :Btþk, the agent would conclude that At failed
to produce its normal consequence, for unknown reasons.
The introduction of the parameter k in Deﬁnition 1 implicitly refers to the delay usually required for A to
produce its eﬀect, (namely, to make B happen). This would suggest a further condition for the ascription of
causality, namely, that the value of k be consistent with the agent’s beliefs about such a delay when A takes
place. In the rest of this article, we will assume this condition to be satisﬁed.3. Properties of causal ascriptions
In this section, properties of our deﬁnition of causality are reviewed. The validity of the results below pre-
supposes the setting of system P only.3.1. Impossibility of mutual causality
Proposition 3. From the minimal sequence of events required for C : A)caB, it is impossible to believe
C : B)caA.
Proof. The ascription by an agent that C : A)caB requires (in addition to particular beliefs of the agent) that
the minimal sequence f:Bt;At;Btþkg has taken place. This is clearly incompatible with the simultaneous ascrip-
tion that C : B)caA, since there is obviously no t 0, k 0 such that f:Bt;At;Btþkg can be reconciliated with
f:At0 ;Bt0 ;At0þk0 g. h
Note that Proposition 3 does not exclude that, in turn, A is perceived to cause B, then, later, B is perceived
to cause A, in an oscillatory-like fashion.3.2. Preference for abnormal causes
Psychologists show that abnormal conditions are more likely to be selected by human agents as the cause of
an event [32] and all the more so if this event is itself abnormal [33] (see also [34] in the area of legal philos-
ophy). Our model reﬂects this preference: Only what is abnormal in a given context can be perceived as caus-
ing a change in the normal course of things in this context.
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Proof. If C : A)caB, it holds that C :B, C ^ A B. Using HD, C ^ A B implies C :A _ B. Using AND,
we get C ð:A _ BÞ ^ :B, that is C :A ^ :B, and by RW, C :A. h
Example 5 (The unreasonable driver). Let us imagine an agent who believes it is normal to be drunk in the
context of driving (Drive Drunk). This agent may think that it is exceptional to have an accident when driv-
ing (Drive :Accident). In that case, the agent cannot believe that accidents are exceptional as well when driv-
ing while drunk: Drive ^ Drunk :Accident. As a consequence, when learning that someone got drunk, drove
his car, and had an accident, this agent will not consider that Drive : Drunk)caAccident.
A notable and straightforward consequence of Proposition 4 is that an agent who perceives A to be the
cause of B in context C will also assume, if not told otherwise, that A was false before it became true at time
t – provided that context C is assumed to have been stable for some time before t.3.3. Transitivity
Although many models of causation consider that causality should be transitive (e.g., [35]), Deﬁnition 1
does not grant general transitivity to the causal ascription )ca – only a restricted form of transitivity holds.
Note that it is an open question whether transitivity is desirable in the speciﬁc case of causality ascription.
If C : A)caB and C : B)caD, it does not always follow that C : A)caD. Formally: C :B and A ^ C B
and C :D and B ^ C D do not entail C :D and A ^ C D, because itself is not transitive.
Although)ca is not generally transitive, it becomes so in one particular case.
Proposition 6. If C : A)caB, C : B)caD, B ^ C A, and D reportedly took place after A, then C : A)caD.
Proof. From the deﬁnition of C : B)caD, it holds that B ^ C D. From B ^ C A and B ^ C D, applying
Cautious Monotony yields A ^ B ^ C D, which together with A ^ C B (from the deﬁnition of C : A)caB)
yields by Cut A ^ C D; since it holds from the deﬁnition of C : B)caD that C :D, the two parts of the
deﬁnition of C : A)caD that involve background knowledge are satisﬁed. Furthermore, C : A)caB requires
a sequence fAt;:Bt;Btþkg and C : B)caD requires a sequence fBt0 ;:Dt0 ;Dt0þk0 g. From C :D, it holds that
:Dt (while it holds that Dt0þk0 , it cannot be the case that t = t 0 + k 0 from the condition that D reportedly took
place after A, that is, t < t 0 + k 0). Hence the sequence fAt;:Dt;Dt0þk0 g is valid, as required by C : A)caD. h
Example 7 (Mud on the plates). Driving back from the countryside, you get a ﬁne because your plates are
muddy, Drive :Mud)caFine. Let us assume that you perceive your driving to the countryside as the cause
for the plates to be muddy, Drive : Countryside)caMud. Transitivity will apply (and yield Drive:Country-
side)caFine) as soon as it holds hold that Mud ^ Drive Countryside: If mud on your plates usually means
that you went to the countryside, then the trip can be considered the cause of the ﬁne. If the presence of mud
on your plates does not allow to infer that you went to the countryside (perhaps you also regularly drive
through muddy streets where you live), then transitivity is no longer warranted; you will only consider that
the mud caused the ﬁne, not that the trip did.
Note also that the restricted transitivity property expressed in Proposition 6 agrees well with the fact that
reports often identify actionswith their consequences, when the latter are prototypically diagnostic of the former.
For example, one may either say that a fast driver had an accident because he had been drinking (action) or
because he was inebriated (consequence). Indeed, in this situation, one can assume that Inebriated Drinking.3.4. Entailment and causality ascriptions
Classical entailment  does not preserve )ca. If C : A)caB and B  B 0, one cannot say that C : A)caB 0.
Indeed, while A ^ C B 0 follows by right weakening [19] from A ^ C B, it is not generally true that C :B0,
given that C :B.
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since C :B and A ^ C B do not entail A 0 ^ C B when A 0  A. This fact is due to the extreme cautiousness
of System P. In contrast, assuming Rational Monotony would enable the latter inference insofar as
A ^ C :A0 does not hold, as shown in the following example.
Example 8 (Stone throwing). An agent believes that a window shattered because a stone was thrown at it
(Window : Stone)caShatter), based on its beliefs that Window :Shatter and Stone ^Window Shatter.
Using the Cautious Monotony of System P, it is not possible to predict that the agent would make a similar
ascription if a small stone had been thrown (SmallStone), or if a white stone had been thrown (WhiteStone), or
even if a big stone had been thrown (BigStone), although it holds that SmallStone  Stone, White-
Stone  Stone, and BigStone  Stone. Adding Rational Monotony [20] to System P allows the ascriptions
Window:BigStone)caShatter and Window :WhiteStone)caShatter, but also Window : SmallStone) caShat-
ter. To block this last ascription, it would be necessary that the agent has speciﬁc knowledge about the
harmlessness of small stones, such as Window ^ Smallstone Shatter or even Window ^ Smallstone :Shatter
(or if it were known that stones thrown at windows are generally not small).3.5. Stability with respect to disjunction and conjunction
)ca is stable with respect to disjunction, both on the right and on the left, and stable with respect to con-
junction on the right. Such properties were laid bare in [12] in the setting of qualitative possibility theory. The
following proposition shows their validity in system P.
Proposition 9. The following properties hold:
(1) If C : A)caB and C : A)caB 0, then C : A) caB ^ B 0.
(2) If C : A)caB and C : A)caB 0, then C : A)caB _ B 0.
(3) If C : A)caB and C : A 0 )caB, then C : A _ A 0 )caB.Proof. Applying AND to the ﬁrst part of the deﬁnitions of C : A)caB and C : A)caB 0, i.e., C :B and
C :B0, yields C :B ^ :B0, which together with Right Weakening, yields C :B _ :B0, and thus
C :ðB ^ B0Þ. Now, applying AND to the second part of the deﬁnitions of C : A)caB and C : A)caB 0,
i.e., A ^ C B and A ^ C B 0, yields A ^ C B ^ B 0. The deﬁnition of C : A)caB ^ B 0 is thus satisﬁed,
and Fact 1 is proved.
The second fact is proved similarly, just noticing that C :B ^ :B0, and A ^ C B _ B 0, obtained from
A ^ C B ^ B 0 by Right weakening, is exactly C : A)caB _ B0.
The proof of Fact 3 is obtained by separately applying OR to the ﬁrst parts and the second parts of the
deﬁnitions of C : A)caB and C : A)caB 0. h
)ca is not stable with respect to conjunction on the left. If C : A)caB and C : A 0 )caB, then it is not
always the case that C : A ^ A 0 )caB.
Note that left conjunction of causal ascriptions would be pragmatically incongruous. If one believes that
C : A)caB and that C : A 0 )caB, it would be quite misleading to assert that C : A ^ A 0 )caB from a conver-
sational point of view, as it would suggest that both A and A 0 were needed to make B happen. If indeed either
one of A and A 0 are perceived as suﬃcient for having caused B, it is more cooperative to assert
C : A _ A 0 )caB than C : A ^ A 0 )caB.
Example 10 (Busy professors). Suppose that professors in your department seldom show up early at the oﬃce
(Prof :Early). However, they generally do so when they have many student papers to mark
(Prof ^Mark Early), and also when they have a grant proposal to write (Prof ^ Grant Early). Today, a
colleague is showing up early, and you know she has many papers to mark and a grant proposal to write. You
are ready to say that the papers caused her to come early (Prof :Mark)caEarly), and also to say that the
grant proposal caused her to come early (Prof : Grant)caEarly). Would you ﬁnd it appropriate to say that the
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impression that one and only one of those would have been insuﬃcient for her to come in early.
More formally, the failure of left conjunction for causal ascriptions is once again due to the cautiousness of
System P; for C : A ^ A 0 )caB to hold, it is necessary that C ^ A A 0 or, alternatively, that C ^ A 0 A. Then
Cautious Monotony will yield A ^ A 0 ^ C B. Rational Monotony can soften this constraint and make it
enough that C ^ A :A0 or C ^ A0 :A. Thus, left conjunction will fail when it is abnormal to observe A
and A 0 at the same time, for example when A :A0. Note that it may also happen that A ^ A0 ^ C :B without
creating any inconsistency.
Example 11 (Busy professors, continued). Suppose that in your department, it is very uncommon to have
many papers to mark and a grant proposal to write on the same day, say, Grant :Mark. This might make it
even more unlikely that you will say your colleague came in early because she had many papers to write and a
grant proposal to write. If Grant :Mark, it is impossible to feel sure that Prof :Mark ^ Grant)ca Early. For
example, it might be the case that faced with such an exceptional workload, professors usually prefer working
at home all day rather than coming to the oﬃce and be distracted. If Grant Mark does not hold, then it is
also impossible to come to the conclusion that Prof :Mark ^ Grant)ca Early. In that situation, when a
professor does anyway show up early when she has papers to mark and a proposal to write, one might look for
another explanation: maybe she has an important meeting early in the morning, that she could not reschedule
even though she wanted to stay home and work?4. Facilitation: deﬁnition and experimentation
Causality is quite a strong notion, and one might suspect that some notion not quite as strong may also
make sense in some situations. For instance, suppose some fact is generally believed to hold in a certain con-
text, and the agent does not believe in that fact any longer in some restricted context, without necessarily
believing its contrary. In this case the agent will be more cautious in its causal interpretation of the sequence
of events. In this section, we model a companion relation to causality, that we call facilitation. Modelling
this relation requires to complement System P with Rational Monotony. Furthermore, the distinction between
causality and the new notion of facilitation is sanctioned, as we will see, by the results of two experiments.
4.1. A variant of causality: facilitation
Assume that in a given context C, the occurrence of event B is known to be exceptional (i.e., C :B), and
that indeed :B is observed. Assume now that, further on, a fact F is reported along with B, which becomes
true. If F is such that the agent believes neither F ^ C :B nor F ^ C B (respectively denoted F ^ C :B
and F ^ C B), we will say that in context C, F alone is perceived to have facilitated the occurrence of B
(denoted C : F)fa B), since in some sense the occurrence of F makes the occurrence of B unsurprising (but
not expected) to the agent.
Deﬁnition 12 (Facilitation ascription). Let us assume that an agent learns of the sequence :Bt, F t, Btþk. Let us
call Ct (the context) the conjunction of all other facts known by or reported to the agent at time t. If the agent
possesses the piece of default knowledge that C :B, but it holds for the agent that F ^ C :B and F ^ C B,
the agent will perceive Ft as having facilitated the occurrence of Bt + k in context Ct, denoted Ct : Ft )faBt + k.
Example 13 (Driving while intoxicated, again). When driving, one has generally no accident,
Drive :Accident. This is no longer true when driving while drunk, which is not as safe (Drive^
Drunk :Accident), even though it does not systematically or almost systematically generate accidents
(Drive ^ Drunk Accident). Suppose now that an accident took place, the driver being drunk. Drunk will only
be judged as having facilitated the accident. In order to make a causality ascription, the agent needs a stronger
piece of evidence, for instance, that not only the driver was drunk but that he drove fast, as accidents are much
more likely to occur in this case.
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edge base of the agent. In fact, could be understood in two diﬀerent ways: Either F ^ C :B just means
that F ^ C :B is not deducible from the agent’s knowledge base, or it could mean that the agent really
knows it is impossible to assert F ^ C :B. The latter interpretation is stronger, and needs a more expressive
language than the one of system P. The ﬁrst interpretation is the right one here, because Rational Monotony
means that the agent reasons in a monotonic way unless something that blocks monotonicity is believed, and
not that the agent reasons in a monotonic way when it is aware not to know a certain conditional. The mod-
elling of facilitation thus requires a conditional knowledge-base closed under System P and Rational Monot-
ony, for instance obeying Rational Closure, i.e. the setting of possibility theory [30].
Note that Deﬁnition 12 is less committing than saying that F ‘prevents’ :B from persisting: does not allow
the jump from ‘not having :B’ to ‘B’. In Deﬁnition 1, the fact that B is exceptional in context C precludes the
possibility for C to be perceived as the cause of B – but not the possibility that B  C, i.e., that C is a necessary
condition of B. Thus, context can be a necessary condition of B without being perceived as its cause.
An interesting situation arises when an agent only knows that C :B and F ^ C :B, and learns of the
sequence of events :Bt (in context C), F t, Btþk. Although this situation should lead the agent to judge that
C : Ft )faBt + k, it may be tempting to judge that C:Ft )caBt + k, as long as no other potential cause reportedly
took place.
Moreover, Proposition 4 has a counterpart for facilitation:
Proposition 14. If C : F)fa B, then C :F .
Proof. Assume C :F . The Rational Monotony of enforces C ^ F :B from C :F and C :B; thus, it
cannot be the case that C : F)faB since the facilitation relation requires that C ^ F :B. h
The abnormality of a fact F perceived as facilitating another fact B can thus be established under the
assumption of Rational Monotony.
Example 15 (The unreasonable driver is back). Let us imagine an agent who believes it is normal to be drunk
in the context of driving (Drive Drunk). This agent may think that it is exceptional to have an accident when
driving (Drive :Accident). In that case, the agent cannot but believe that accidents are exceptional as well
when driving while drunk: Drive ^ Drunk :Accident. As a consequence, when learning that someone got
drunk, drove his car, and had an accident, this agent will neither consider that Drive : Drunk)caAccident nor
that Drive : Drunk)faAccident.
There is no previous empirical evidence supporting the distinction we introduce between ascriptions of
cause and facilitation. To check whether this distinction has intuitive appeal to lay reasoners, we conducted
two experiments in which we presented participants with diﬀerent sequences of events. We assessed their rel-
evant background knowledge, from which we predicted the relations of cause and facilitation they should
ascribe between the events in the sequence. We then compared these predictions to their actual ascriptions.
4.2. Experiment 1
4.2.1. Methods
Participants were 46 undergraduate students, untrained in formal logic or in philosophy. Participants read
the stories of three characters, and answered six questions after reading each story. In this section, we give a
detailed presentation of the ﬁrst story and the six questions that followed, and summarize the rest of the mate-
rial. The ﬁrst story read as follows:Benoıˆt, who had never felt especially tired, recently took nightshifts at work, with a new boss who turned
out to be very stressful. One month later, Benoıˆt constantly feels very tired.The ﬁrst three questions were meant to check out each participant’s background knowledge regarding the
relations between nightshifts and feeling constantly tired, working under a stressful boss and feeling constantly




760 J.-F. Bonnefon et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 752–765What do you think is the most common, the most normal: taking nightshifts and feeling constantly tired,
or taking nightshifts and not feeling constantly tired? or are those equally common and normal?Participants who chose the ﬁrst, second, and third answer were assumed to endorse either one of the fol-
lowing statements: Nightshifts Tired; Nightshifts :Tired; and ðNightshifts TiredÞ ^ ðNightshifts :TiredÞ,
respectively.
The fourth, ﬁfth, and sixth questions measured participants’ ascriptions of causality and facilitation
between (i) taking nightshifts and feeling constantly tired, (ii) working under a stressful boss and feeling con-
stantly tired, and (iii) taking nightshifts under a stressful boss and feeling constantly tired. For example, the
fourth question read:Fill in the blank with the word ‘caused’ or ‘facilitated’, as seems the most appropriate. If neither seems
appropriate, ﬁll in the blank with ‘XXX’: Taking nightshifts . . . the fact that Benolˆt feels constantly tired.The whole process was then repeated with a second and a third story. In the second story, the character
took nightshifts and had become a dad. In the third story, the character had a stressful boss and had become
a dad. Thus, overall, the three characters were described as constantly feeling very tired (an uncommon feeling
for them) after two recent changes in their lives, taken from a pool of three: taking nightshifts, having a stress-
ful boss, becoming a dad. For each character, the ﬁrst three questions assessed participants’ background
knowledge with respect to (i) the relation between the ﬁrst event and feeling constantly tired; (ii) the second
event and feeling constantly tired; and (iii) the conjunction of the two events and feeling constantly tired.
Then, the fourth, ﬁfth, and sixth questions assessed participants ascriptions of causality or facilitation between
(i) the ﬁrst event and feeling constantly tired; (ii) the second event and feeling constantly tired; and (iii) the
conjunction of the two events and feeling constantly tired.
The experiment was conducted in French,4 and the order in which the stories were presented to the partic-
ipants was counterbalanced (i.e., they were presented in one order to half of the participants and in the oppo-
site order to the other half).
4.2.2. Results
Out of the 116 ascriptions that the model predicted to be of facilitation, 68% indeed were so, 11% were of
causality, and 21% were neither. Out of the 224 ascriptions that the model predicted to be of causality, 46%
indeed were, 52% were of facilitation, and 2% were neither. (Remember that what is meant by ‘ascription’ is a
choice of term – the ascription is of causality for participants who selected the term ‘caused’, it is of facilitation
for participants who selected the term ‘facilitated’ and the ascription is blank for participants who declined to
choose a term.) The global trend in the results is thus that background knowledge that theoretically matches a
facilitation ascription indeed largely leads people to make such an ascription, while background knowledge
that theoretically matches a causality ascription leads people to divide equally between causality and facilita-
tion ascriptions. This trend is statistically reliable for almost all ascriptions required by the task. Relevant sta-
tistics (v2 scores) are higher than 7.7 for seven out of the nine ascriptions (p<.05, one-tailed, in all cases), and
higher than 3.2 for the remaining two ascriptions (p<.10, one-tailed, in both cases). From these results, it
appears that the notion of facilitation does have intuitive appeal to lay reasoners, and that it is broadly used
as deﬁned in our model. In particular, it clearly has a role to play in situations where an ascription of causality
sounds too strong a conclusion, but no ascription at all sounds not strong enough.
4.3. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to consolidate the results of Experiment 1 and to answer the following ques-
tions: Does the fact that background knowledge matches Deﬁnition 1 or Deﬁnition 12 aﬀect the strength
of the link participants perceive between two reported events, and does this perceived strength in turn deter-
mine whether they make an ascription of causality or facilitation?e phrase ‘a favorise´’ was used for ‘facilitated’, instead of the apparently straightforward translation ‘a facilite´’, for it seemed







Fig. 1. Mediating role of perceived strength for the eﬀect of background knowledge on ascription. Coeﬃcients are standardized bs,
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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Participants were 41 undergraduates. Elements of their background knowledge were assessed as in Exper-
iment 1, in order to select triples of propositions hContext,Factor,Eﬀecti that matched either Deﬁnition 1 or
Deﬁnition 12. For example, a participant might believe that one has generally no accident when driving, but
that one will generally have an accident when driving after some serious drinking; for this participant,
hDrive,SeriousDrinking,Accidenti is a match with Deﬁnition 1. Experiment 2 used a richer variety of themes
than Experiment 1, including alcohol and road accidents, the appropriate preparation of tea, and the way
smoking can deteriorate one’s sensitivity to subtle ﬂavors.
Once background beliefs regarding each triple were assessed, participants rated on a 9-point scale how
strongly Factor and Eﬀect were related. Finally, as a measure of ascription, they chose an appropriate term
to describe the relation between Factor and Eﬀect, from a list including causes, facilitates, refutes, explains,
justiﬁes, and is independent of.4.3.2. Results
Out of the 16 ascriptions that the model predicted to be of facilitation, 14 were so, and two were of cau-
sality. Out of the 25 ascriptions that the model predicted to be of causality, 11 were so, and 14 were of facil-
itation. Beliefs thus had the expected inﬂuence on ascriptions, v2 = 4.5, p < .05. The trend observed in
Experiment 1 is replicated in Experiment 2. We also conducted a mediation analysis of our data, which consists
in a series of three regression analyzes (see Fig. 1).
In all regression analyzes, background knowledge was encoded as 1 when it matched Deﬁnition 12, and as
+1 when it matched Deﬁnition 1. Ascriptions of facilitation were encoded as 1, and ascriptions of causality
were encoded as +1. The ﬁrst regression assessed the eﬀect of background knowledge on ascription, which was
statistically signiﬁcant, b ¼ :33, p < :05. The second regression assessed the eﬀect of background knowledge
on perceived strength, which was also signiﬁcant, b ¼ :41, p<.01. In the third regression, background
knowledge and perceived strength were entered simultaneously. Perceived strength was a reliable predictor
of ascription, b = .29, p<.05, which was no longer the case for background knowledge, b = .23, p > .05. Data
thus meet the requirements of a mediational eﬀect. We can therefore conclude that whether the background
knowledge of participants matches Deﬁnition 12 or Deﬁnition 1 determines their ﬁnal ascription of C : Fac-
tor)fa Eﬀect or C : Factor)ca Eﬀect through its eﬀect on the perceived strength of the link between Factor
and Eﬀect.
The two experiments we have reported show that our basic deﬁnitions of causality and facilitation ascrip-
tions have some degree of descriptive validity. Human subjects do diﬀerentiate between causality and facilita-
tion, and broadly along the lines featured in our deﬁnitions. The next section will introduce a third notion
besides cause and facilitation, namely, that of justiﬁcation – but it will ﬁrst discuss our model in relation to
previous work on causality.5. Related works
In this section, we ﬁrst compare our approach to causality with previous works not focused on diagnosis.
Then we show a distinction between causality ascription and the notion of explanation.
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One of the earliest formal account of causality is due to Von Wright [36]. According to this author, an
action caused p to be true if and only if either:
• p was false before the action, and had the action not been taken, p would not have become true, or
• the action maintains p true against the normal course of things, thus preventing p from becoming false.
The ﬁrst situation straightforwardly relates to Deﬁnition 1. The second situation can also be represented in
our setting: Bt is known to be true, and after At takes place Bt+k is still true, although in the normal course of
things, had A not happened, B would have become false, i.e., Bt ^ C :Btþk. The agent knowledge also
includes Bt ^ At ^ C Bt + k. Letting C 0 = Bt ^ C, this can be rewritten C0 :Btþk and A ^ C 0 Bt + k, which
is formally Deﬁnition 1.
Our approach is in fact directly inspired by previous works on epistemic qualitative independence in the
setting of possibility theory, especially [12]. In this paper, believing B is said to be independent of A when
learning A does not aﬀect our belief in B. At the opposite, A is said to refute B when learning A does turns
our belief in B into believing :B. Our notion of causality is directly based on the latter notion, in the scope of
analyzing a sequence of reported events, and using system P instead of possibility theory. When B is believed
and learning A only leads to drop this belief, A is said to ‘cancel’ B in [12]. This notion is instrumental in our
deﬁnition of facilitation, in a setting that is mathematically equally expressive to possibility theory.
Where our qualitative approach represents the knowledge underlying causal ascriptions by means of non-
monotonic consequence relationships, quantitative approaches would represent knowledge by means of struc-
tural equations. Following [5], Halpern and Pearl [37,38] have proposed a model that distinguishes real causes
(cause in fact) from potential causes, by using an a priori distinction between ‘endogenous’ variables (the pos-
sible values of which are governed by structural equations, for example physical laws), and ‘exogenous’ vari-
ables (determined by external factors). Exogenous variables cannot be deemed causal. Halpern and Pearl’s
deﬁnition of causality formalizes the notion of an active causal process. More precisely, the fact A that a sub-
set of endogenous variables has taken some deﬁnite values is the real cause of an event B if (i) A and B are true
in the real world, (ii) this subset is minimal, (iii) another value assignment to this subset would make B false,
the values of the other endogenous variables that do not directly participate to the occurrence of B being ﬁxed
in some manner and (iv) A alone is enough for B to occur in this context. This approach, thanks to the richness
of background knowledge when it is represented in structural equations, makes it possible to treat especially
diﬃcult examples.5
Our model is however not to be construed as an alternative or a competitor to models based on structural
equations, like the one of Halpern and Pearl. Indeed, we see our approach as a complement to structural equa-
tion modeling. One might not have access to the accurate information needed to build a structural equation
model; in this case, our less demanding model might still be operable. Alternatively, a decision-support system
may be able to build a structural equation model of the situation, although its users only have access to qual-
itative knowledge. In that case, the system will be able to compare its own causality ascriptions to the conclu-
sions of the qualitative model, and take appropriate explanatory steps, would those ascriptions be too
diﬀerent. Indeed, our model does not aim at identifying the true, objective cause of an event, but rather at
predicting what causal ascription an agent would make based on the limited information it has at its disposal.
Models based on structural equations are often supplemented with the useful notion of intervention [5]. In
many situations, ﬁnding the cause of an event will be much easier if the agent can directly intervene in the
manner of an experimenter. In future work, we intend to explore the possibility of supplementing our
own model with a similar notion by means of a do(•) operator. As for now, we only give a brief example that5 Ascribing causality when analyzing a set of reported facts may ﬁnd its motivation in the search for responsibility behind the occurrence
of these facts. Building upon the notion of potential cause, Chockler and Halpern [39] have introduced deﬁnitions of responsibility and
blame: The extent to which a cause (or an agent) is responsible for an eﬀect is graded, and depends on the presence of other potential
causes (or agents). Clearly, the assessment of responsibility from identiﬁcation of causal relationships raises further problems that are
beyond the scope of this article.
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ity. A stricter condition for an ascription of causality C: A)ca B (respectively, facilitation) would be to
require that the background knowledge part of Deﬁnition 1 (respectively, Deﬁnition 12) applies to do(A),
B, C, where do(A) means that the occurrence of A is forced by an intervention – thus requiring that the def-
initions take into account the three distinct components that are: factual observations, pieces of beliefs, and
known interventions.
Example 16 (Yellow teeth). An agent learns that someone took up smoking, that this person’s teeth yellowed,
and that this person developed lung cancer. The agent believes that generally speaking, it is abnormal to be a
smoker, to have yellow teeth, and to develop lung cancer (respectively, C :Smoke, C :Yellow, C :Lung).
The agent believes that it is normal for smokers to have yellow teeth (C ^ Smoke Yellow) and to develop
lung cancer (C ^ Smoke Lung), and that it is not abnormal for someone who has yellow teeth to develop
lung cancer (C ^ Yellow :Lung). From these beliefs and observations, Deﬁnitions 12 and 1 would allow for
various ascriptions, including the following one: Smoking caused the yellow teeth which in turn facilitated lung
cancer. With the additional constraint based on the do(•) operator, only one set of ascriptions remains
possible: Both the yellow teeth and the lung cancer were caused by smoking. Yellow teeth cannot be said
anymore to facilitate lung cancer because, inasmuch as lung cancer is generally abnormal, it holds that
C ^ doðYellowÞ : Lung: There is no reason to think that one will develop lung cancer after painting one’s
teeth yellow.5.2. Causality vs. justiﬁcation
Perceived causality as expressed in Deﬁnition 1 should be distinguished from the following situation, which
we term ‘justiﬁcation.’ We write that C : A)ju B when an agent judges that the occurrence of A in context C
gave reason to expect the occurrence of B.
Deﬁnition 17 (Justification). Let us assume that an agent learns of the sequence :Bt, At, Bt + k. Let us call C
(the context) the conjunction of all other facts known by or reported to the agent at time t. If the agent
possesses the piece of default knowledge that A ^ C B, and if it holds for the agent that C :B and C B,
the agent will perceive At to justify the expectation that Bt + k would occur in context Ct, denoted
Ct : At )ju Bt + k.
What we call justiﬁcation is borrowed again from [12] and is akin to the notion of explanation following
Spohn [40]: Namely, ‘A is a reason for B’ when raising the epistemic rank for A raises the epistemic rank
for B. Ga¨rdenfors [41] captured this view to some extent, assuming that A is a reason for B if B is not retained
in the contraction of A. Williams et al. [42] could account for the Spohnian view in a more reﬁned way using
kappa-rankings and transmutations, distinguishing between weak and strong explanations. As our framework
can easily be given a possibilistic semantics [30], it could properly account for this line of thought, although
our distinction between perceived causation and epistemic justiﬁcation is not the topic of the above works.
In our model this distinction is very clear. Faced with facts C, :Bt, At, Btþk, an agent believing that C :B,
C B and A ^ C B may doubt that the change from :Bt to Bt + k is really due to At, although the latter is
indeed the very reason for the lack of surprise at having Bt + k reported. Indeed, situation :Bt at time t appears
to the agent to be contingent, since it is neither a normal nor an abnormal course of things in context C. This
clearly departs from the situation where C :B and A ^ C B, wherein the agent will judge that C : A)caB.
In a nutshell, the case whereby C :B, C B and A ^ C B cannot be interpreted as the recognition of a
causal phenomenon by an agent: All that can be said is that reporting A caused the agent to start believing
B, and that it should not be surprised of having Bt + k reported.
6. Concluding remarks
We have presented a simple qualitative model of the causal ascriptions an agent will make from its back-
ground default knowledge, when faced with a series of events. The model assumes that the agent’s beliefs
are represented in the setting of non-monotonic reasoning, and more precisely in System P. A new notion, less
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vided that the Rational Monotony axiom is added – furthermore, this notion is proved to be cognitively rel-
evant via a set of experimental tests.
The model we have presented is certainly just a ﬁrst step towards a fully satisfactory account of causal
ascription. In a provocatively titled paper (Causality is undeﬁnable), Zadeh [43] illustrated the diﬃculty of
causal ascriptions by means of the following example:
Example 18 (From Zadeh [43]). I am called by a friend. He needs my help and asks me to rush to his home. I
jump into my car and drive as fast as I can. At an intersection, I am hit by another car. I am killed. Who
caused my death? My friend; I; or the driver of the car that hits me. Note that in such a scenario, it seems
possible to expand the list of candidate causes very easily, in an almost endless manner, as here, e.g., ‘‘my
emotionality that limits my capacities to avoid accidents,’’ ‘‘in my hurry, I had not fasten my seat belt,’’ or
even ‘‘the fact that the phone was working and I was there for receiving the call.’’
While we do not claim that our model can entirely take care of such an example, we note that it might well
handle some of its crucial aspects. For instance, not fastening the seat belt would likely count as a facilitation,
rather than as a cause of death. Picking up the phone would likely not be considered a cause of death, because
of the restricted transitivity of causal ascriptions in our model. Suppose that picking up the phone caused lis-
tening to the friend’s story, which caused the fast driving, which caused the accident, which caused the death.
Did picking up the phone caused the death? In our model, for such a conclusion to hold, one would need to
accept that traﬃc accidents are usually diagnostic of fast driving, that fast driving is usually diagnostic of hav-
ing listened to a friend’s call for help, and that having listened to a friend’s call for help is usually diagnostic of
having picked up the phone. At least the second link in that chain is very doubtful.
Future developments of our model should include the formal properties of facilitation in the formal
approach, and study the potential of the notion of intervention in the model. In addition to supplementing
this model with a do(•) operator, we intend to extend our present work in three main directions. First, we
should be able to equip our framework with possibilistic qualitative counterparts to Bayesian networks
[44], since System P augmented with Rational Monotony can be represented in possibilistic logic [30].6 Second,
we should be able to derive postulates for causality and facilitation from the independence postulates pre-
sented in [12]. Finally, in parallel to further theoretical elaboration, we will maintain a systematic experimental
program that will test the psychological plausibility of our deﬁnitions, properties, and postulates.
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